ON THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Anthony D'Amato I. THE CONCEPT OF LEGITIMACY
In the draft paper I prepared before coming to grand old Heidelberg to participate in this conference, I began by taking the position that the word "legitimate" was hopelessly ambiguous. It seemed to be trying to occupy a space between "lawful" and "unlawful", yet that space is hard to measure or even imagine. Of course the ambiguity can be removed by eliminating the space-by stipulating that "lawful" and "legitimate" are synonymous. Black's Law Dictionary tells us simply that "legitimate" is that which is "lawful, legal, recognized by law, or according to law." Simple, but not helpful.
However, in listening to the distinguished participants during the conference, I
became persuaded that a space all its own might exist for "legitimacy" in international law. I'm not at all sure that such a space exists in domestic law. But international law has some features that distinguish it from domestic law. Accordingly, in revising this paper for publication, I take the opportunity to begin it a different way, and to present what I believe is an unambiguous example in international law of a real difference between lawful and legitimate.
Legitimacy can sometimes usefully describe a space between international law and international politics. I will use as an example the distinction in international law between de jure and de facto recognition of governments. Although I will only discuss one real case, the principles involved can readily be extended to almost all other cases of recognition of governments.
The case I want to discuss is the situation that arose in 1936 when Italy, seeking to assert on the world stage its new fascist personality, abruptly invaded and conquered the state of Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Selassie, who embodied the Ethiopian government, fled to Great Britain.
Italy set up a functioning government in Ethiopia. Now the beleagured country had two competing governments: the effective puppet government in Addis Ababa, and the government in exile consisting solely of the person of Haile Selassie. Great Britain, not wishing to reward Italy for its aggression, maintained its existing de jure recognition Clearly the Foreign Office must petition the de facto government of Ethiopia, which is in this case the King of Italy. For it is obviously the de facto government that has the requisite power to release or to detain the British citizens.
There are many similar situations that can arise: a British company wants to enter into a contract to construct a bridge in Ethiopia and wants to know its rights if it enters into a contract with the King of Italy. Or suppose some Ethiopian citizens temporarily in Great Britain want to obtain visas to enter Ethiopia. If the King of Italy is the functioning government of Ethiopia, then he must be dealt with in order to allow daily interactions with the conquered territory of Ethiopia. Any conflicts with Ethiopia (which the King renamed Abyssinia) can only be resolved, as a practical matter, if the King of Italy is a party. The fact that the King of Italy is not the lawful government of Ethiopia does not disable it from being a responsible party to these routine situations that can come up from time to time. Accordingly, it makes pragmatic sense to call the King of Italy the legitimate government of Ethiopia even as we continue to designate Haile Selassie as its lawful government.
What this example shows is the existence of a definite space in international legal discourse for the term "legitimate' as distinct from the term "lawful." More importantly,
it shows that what is legal in international law is sometimes very close to what is political.
2 This is perhaps best exemplified by the way customary law is formed. When a rule of customary law is in the process of being formed, there was no prior rule on the subject (by definition). There was only a political controversy, resolved in some political fashion. Its resolution, however, is then adopted by the international legal system and called a "precedent" (or a "custom") under customary international law. Thereafter in similar conflicts governing rule will be identical to the original rule that was arrived at empirically in the first political controversy. Hence customary law is constructed directly upon the political practices of states.
Once we see how endemic is the conception of legitimacy in international law, we can begin to use it cautiously in describing phenomena that interface the legal and the political. Prominent among these phenomena are international governance institutions.
2 Students who first encounter international law in law school can object strenuously that the King of Italy should not be able to shoot and bomb his way into the position of a legitimate government of Ethiopia. And indeed today a country cannot obtain title to territory by conquest. But back in 1936-38 the question still seemed to be open. This does not mean that the Ethiopian example won't happen again; it only means that it will happen in non-conquest situations, such as two equally well situated and competing military groups competing for governmental control of a country that is temporarily without a government. GATT and the WTO. These overlaps would be difficult to ascertain, and yet even a rough approximation might prove useful for some purposes. The road to world government is a one-way street. Once that government arrives, there will be no counterforce in the world to take it down-no "humanitarian intervention" so to speak.
II. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
Compared to customary international law, I would argue that the law made by international institutions is illegitimate. It is a top-down law as compared with customary international law, which is bottom-up. We know how international institutions make law:
they have a legislative branch and an executive branch. It is worth spending a moment to make some additional comments on how international law makes customary law.
IV. FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the beginning, before nation-states, international law existed only as a potential; it had no actual existence because it lacked substance. The substance would come from the new nation-states. But this presented an immediate problem: if what
states did became what they should do, then everything states did would be lawful. Some kind of filter had to be imposed in order to distinguish some of the practices of states as law-creating from other practices that would either be irrelevant to law or counter to it.
Yet this raises a second problem: before there are any rules of international law at all, how can we say some state practices could be counter to the law?
Since there are no pre-existing rules by definition, we must assume that of all the possible rules that could be incorporated into international law, only those rules will be incorporated that are compatible with the idea of law. Law is an invention designed to channel the behavior of persons toward peace and stability and away from anarchy.
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Anarchy is the enemy of law. Thus the new international legal system will be attracted to state practices that imply rules that promote peace and stability.
Suppose a controversy breaks out between two states. If the controversy is later resolved short of war, then its resolution must be deemed "peaceful." The new international legal system will adopt the rule that governed the resolution of the dispute.
The adopted rule becomes a rule of customary international law. Indeed, this outcome is exactly what the other states in the system want. They do not want any controversy to escalate into general conflagration; rather, they want it contained within the interaction of the two states. Thus the inferred operative rule governing that containment is a rule that all the other states will implicitly adopt as a rule of customary international law that will henceforth apply to all states. The "rule" that we infer to have been operative in producing the conflict-resolution thus automatically constitutes a rule of international customary law. As more controversies are settled short of war, the rules implicitly governing the resolution of those conflicts are added to the corpus of international customary law. The addition is automatic; international customary law simply constitutes the rules that tame the forces of anarchy.
The process I have just described is not rule by the majority, nor rule by consent, court; and the court's judgment becomes a precedent for all other individuals had no part in the initial lawsuit but who just happen to find themselves within the ambit of that precedent. It is simply a matter of the common law "learning" to achieve peace by borrowing its norms from peaceful resolutions of conflicts. The only difference between this process of common-law formation and the formation of international customary law is that the latter (at least in the formative years) lacks an authoritative "court" to impose a settlement upon the parties. But this is not necessarily a shortcoming, for there are times when a judicially imposed "settlement" aggravates rather than settles a conflict. A conspicuous example is the Dred Scott decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1856, allowing the extension of slavery into the new territories of the United States. 10 The
Court's unfortunate decision was a major factor leading to the outbreak, four years later, of the Civil War. The Dred Scott case has been thoroughly vitiated as a precedent. In brief, it is the fact of peaceful conflict-resolution, rather than the method by which it was achieved, that controls its adoption by the overarching legal system, whether it be the domestic legal system or the international legal system.
We find therefore that customary international law consists of norms or rules that earned their way into the corpus of customary law by proving their compatibility with other rules and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Customary international law turns out to be an inductive process of retaining the results of the resolution of millions of international conflicts. These resolutions, these compromises, these results represent stable solutions to bilateral and multilateral conflicts, achieved usually through negotiation but sometimes simply by letting the problem die of its own weight as attention became focused elsewhere. When negotiation is involved, it will always help 10 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
one side to show that the proposed rule to govern the controversy at hand is the one that is closest to other existing rules in the system. If a proposed rule is compatible with a half-dozen neighbor rules, then the system of rules is more likely to be coherent and hence preserved if the proposed rule is adopted. This would then be a very strong argument in the negotiation in favor of the proffered rule. In short, customary international law is doing its work even though the particular rule at issue is not (yet)
listed in its set of rules.
V. CONCLUSION: INCLUSIVITY V. EXCLUSIVITY
Rules and practices of international institutions may seem benign in their intended effects upon non-member states. Yet realism dictates that we should look beneath the surface of purported altruism. A regional bank, for example, may have investment policies in non-member countries that seem to further the latter's interests, and yet the real party in interest may be the bank itself. For example, building hydroelectric power stations in an underdeveloped country may appear to be in the latter's best interests, but we can be fairly confident that if it were not in the investment bank's financial interests the station would not be built at all.
International institution are top-down, exclusive circle-regimes superimposed upon the globe. In this respect they do not have the equality and democratic bottom-up quality of customary international law. The more than international institutions prosper and grow, the closer we may be getting to a coalition of those institutions that proclaims itself the government of the world. In such a world, customary international law would
